Domain 7 Β· Lesson 2 of 6
Digital Forensics & Investigations
PhΓ‘p y Kα»Ή thuαΊt sα» & Δiα»u tra
Order of Volatility β Collect Most Volatile FIRST
Critical Rule: RAM is lost when the system powers off
Never collect disk first. Start with what disappears β CPU registers, RAM, network state β then move to persistent storage.
CPU Registers & Cache
Lost immediately on power off β most volatile of all
RAM / Main Memory
Running processes, network connections, decryption keys in memory, user sessions
Virtual Memory / Swap File
RAM overflow paged to disk β may contain sensitive data
Network State
ARP cache, routing table, open connections, active sessions
Running Processes & System State
Process list, open file handles, loaded kernel modules
Disk / SSD Storage
Survives power off β file system, logs, application data, artifacts
Removable Media
USB drives, backup tapes
Remote Logs & Monitoring Data
Datadog, GCP Audit Logs, CloudTrail β least volatile, stored externally
Physical Configuration & Network Topology
Static documentation β architecture diagrams, hardware inventory
Forensic Principles & Process
Never Touch the Original
Always create a forensic copy (image) first. Analyze the copy. Any modification to original evidence β even opening a file β changes metadata timestamps and may make it inadmissible.
Write Blockers
Hardware device placed between storage media and investigation machine. Allows reading but prevents any writes β ensures the original is not modified during imaging. Required for court-admissible evidence.
Forensic Imaging
Bit-for-bit copy of all data including deleted files and unallocated space. Tools: dd, FTK Imager, EnCase. Every bit is copied β not just visible files.
Hash Verification
Calculate MD5/SHA-256 of original BEFORE imaging, then hash the copy. Both hashes must match exactly. Proves the copy is identical to the original and has not been tampered with.
Chain of Custody
Document every person who handled the evidence: who, when, why, and what they did. A complete, unbroken chain of custody is required for evidence to be admissible in court.
Broken chain = evidence potentially inadmissible. The case may fail because of this single failure, regardless of technical findings.
Investigation Types & Standards of Proof
| Type | Standard of Proof | Who Investigates | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Administrative | Preponderance of evidence (51%+ likely) | HR / Security team | Discipline, termination |
| Criminal | Beyond reasonable doubt (~99%) | Law enforcement (Police, FBI) | Prosecution, imprisonment |
| Civil | Preponderance of evidence (51%+ likely) | Attorneys / Court | Lawsuit, monetary damages |
| Regulatory | Varies by regulator | Government agency (BSP, SBV, NPC) | Fines, license sanctions |
E-discovery & Legal Hold
E-discovery: Legal process of identifying, preserving, and collecting electronic evidence for litigation. Legal hold: Directive to preserve all potentially relevant data β must be applied BEFORE e-discovery begins. Destroying data after a legal hold is issued = spoliation (serious legal offense).
Anti-Forensics & Cloud Forensics Challenges
Anti-Forensics Techniques
- Log deletion: removing evidence of activity from system logs
- Timestomping: modifying file timestamps to confuse timeline analysis
- Steganography: hiding data inside innocent-looking files (images)
- Encryption: making data unreadable without the key
- Secure deletion: overwriting data so recovery tools can't recover it
Cloud Forensics Challenges
- Shared infrastructure β you don't own the hardware
- Multi-tenancy β physical media shared with other customers
- Data spread across multiple geographic regions
- Limited physical access β can't image a cloud server directly
- Solution: GCP Audit Logs, AWS CloudTrail + contractual forensic access rights in cloud SLA
Key Terms
- Collect evidence in ORDER OF VOLATILITY β RAM before disk. RAM is lost when the system powers off.
- Chain of custody broken = evidence potentially inadmissible in court. Document every hand-off.
- NEVER analyze the original evidence β always create a forensic copy and work from that.
- Hash before AND after imaging β both hashes must match. This proves no tampering during the copy process.
- Legal hold must be in place BEFORE any deletion or modification of potentially relevant data. Violating a legal hold = spoliation.
- Timestomping = modifying file timestamps to hide when files were created/modified β a key anti-forensics technique.
If law enforcement involved: Follow chain of custody for all logs, Datadog exports, and ArgoCD deployment records. Every piece of evidence needs documentation of who handled it, when, and what they did.
Evidence to preserve (in order of volatility):
- Kubernetes pod logs from time of incident (container stdout β volatile if pods restarted)
- PostgreSQL WAL (Write-Ahead Log) from affected tables β shows all data changes
- Vault audit logs β who accessed which secrets, when, from where
- ArgoCD deployment history β what was deployed and when (immutable Git history)
- GCP Audit Logs β available for 400 days β configure export to BigQuery for long-term retention
Cloud forensics note: Container stdout logs in RAM may be lost if pods were restarted during containment. This is why runbooks should specify: collect logs BEFORE stopping pods.
Legal hold trigger: If regulators (NPC Philippines, SBV Vietnam) request records, issue an immediate legal hold on all Platform C data from the incident window. Do NOT rotate logs or archive according to normal retention policy until the hold is lifted.
Practice Quiz
Q1. You arrive at a running server involved in a potential breach. Why should you collect RAM before disk?
βΌ Reveal Answer
Q2. During a forensic investigation, the chain of custody is broken. What is the consequence?
βΌ Reveal Answer
Q3. What is a write blocker and why is it required during evidence collection?
βΌ Reveal Answer
Q4. After imaging a disk, the hash of the original is SHA-256: abc123. The hash of the forensic copy is SHA-256: abc123. What does matching hashes prove?
βΌ Reveal Answer
Q5. An attacker modifies the created/modified timestamps on malware files to match innocent system files. What is this technique called?